Book Reviews
This book comes with extravagant praise on the back. But its thesis, for those interested parties who have been paying attention to the Russian military, is quite simple, even unremarkable. Despite its decline since Soviet times, the Russian Army plays a disproportionate role in politics because Mikhail Gorbachev invited it to do so, then became too powerless to stop it. After that, Boris Yeltsin eagerly accepted this politicization and Vladimir Putin did too, although he significantly altered its dimensions. Thus the Russian government has never been interested in democratizing civil-military relations but rather in politicizing the armed forces for its own purposes. When this fact is coupled with the unbending opposition of the military leadership to genuine defense reform, it becomes apparent why the military's role has grown even while it is continuing to undergo what Barany aptly calls institutional decay.
The astonishment of the reviewers cited on the dust jacket clearly owes much to the fact that many of them who have written extensively about democratization seem to have ignored or overlooked the entire issue of civil-military relations. Sixteen years after the end of Communist control in Russia this omission remains incomprehensible. As Barany forcefully and correctly argues, the challenges involved in effectuating democratic civilian control over the armed forces (and the same holds true for the police, a subject nobody seems to have considered) go to the core of the issues involved in democratization. Furthermore, Barany notes, they also go far in explaining the recent developments in Russian foreign and defense policy which are ever more overtly antiwestern. Antiliberalism and antiwesternism are not accidentally conjoined. Rather, as the author rightfully concludes, they go hand-in-hand and are traceable to the unwillingness to carry out the needed reforms.
Among the many merits of this book is its clear, transparent, and economical style. Barany accomplishes what few in the profession have done. Namely, he is able to use sophisticated theoretical concepts from political science in ways that not only illuminate actual politics but which are readable and enhance the reader's understanding of the issues at stake. While his thesis should not come as a surprise to the handful of specialists who have labored to understand Russian defense policies since the end of the Soviet Union, it will probably be something of a revelation to the vast majority of political scientists who have neglected this dimension of Russia's transformation. Perhaps the gap between scholars looking at democratization and those studying foreign and defense policy may be narrowed as a result of this excellent book. That gap may be the cause of some of the evident failure among many experts to comprehend just how antiwestern Russian foreign and defense policy has become.
This disconnect among experts in the Russian field may exist elsewhere and also clouds our attention of the fact that the organization of the armed forces and the police agency in any state are among the core issues of that state's constitution. That term is used not just to refer to a document but rather to the reality of how the powers that make up the state are constituted and organized. Close examination of these issues in any political system should lead analysts to realize that these processes exercise a decisive influence on the state's defense and foreign policies. Russia's evolution under Yeltsin and Putin since 1993, especially the decisive moment in post-Soviet transition when democracy died after Yeltsin used force to ensure that he would be an unaccountable and unlimited president with a full panoply of power, should not surprise the West. If this well-written and cogently argued book helps readers to overcome that surprise, then it will have been amply worth the time devoted to reading it. Sometimes at the US Naval Academy I have students read a short book by journalist Chris Hedges called What Every Person Should Know About War. Hedges's book walks the reader through the before, during, and after of war, starting before enlistment and ending after you have returned. It is a series of brief answers to even more laconic questions: Will I be sexually assaulted? What does it feel like to die? Will I keep in touch with my buddies? What Was Asked of Us is like reading Hedges's book with the sound turned on. It consists of edited interviews by journalist Trish Wood with veterans of the Iraq War about what war actually was for these 29 men and (a few) women. Some of these soldiers are profane, some almost lyrical, some despondent, some hopeful. Collectively they cover the before, during, and after of their experiences in Iraq from widely varying perspectives. The variation seems part of Wood's thesis: The book is a warning against speaking for others. Everybody has a different view, she seems to say. Beware of oversimplified views (those of politicians and journalists, perhaps).
What Was Asked of Us
Take the "before" of these soldiers. Travis Williams, a Marine, was a self-described "outdoorsy kind of introvert" who saw a movie called Behind Enemy Lines and went the next day to the recruiter to "squelch [his] curiosity." The recruiter asked him, "Are you ready to sign up? Are you ready to be a Marine?" Williams said he would have to ask his mom. The recruiter said, "Well, you're a grown-ass man, aren't you?" Williams comments: "I'll always take [challenges] , so I signed." Another, Joseph Hatcher, an Army infantryman, worked at a 7-Eleven before the war. "As I was lying there in my cot, I tried to think to myself what was the most worthless . . . job I ever had . . . and that was 7-Eleven."
That was his "before." It is also his "after." "So I came back and got my job back, and they pay me ten bucks to restock the cooler." In some cases, the after is quite different from the before. One of the relatively rare officer voices is that of surgeon Earl Hecker, who meditates, "I'm not convinced that all these guys are going to be a part of society anymore. Psychologically they'll be withdrawn because of the trauma they went through. They won't be able to play with their kids the way normal individuals [do] ." He ends with a literary allusion: "Some of these people are the lost generation."
Then there is "during." Not all the voices are negative about battle. One soldier, Adrian Cavazos, speaking of comrades blown up in a suicide bombing, says: "Those men died beautifully because they died fighting for our country." Some are personal. Joseph Hatcher, the 7-Eleven man, says: "I love it. I love the fight." Oth-ers give more details, or describe the gore. Daniel Cotnoir, a Marine identified as being in "Mortuary Affairs," says: "It is gruesome to just beyond the realm of a horror film." The great majority are shocked by the blood, the heat, the killing, the chaos. Almost all are decorated soldiers; Wood lists their ribbons.
If the overall impression left by these voices is that war is individual worlds of chaos, most of these individuals persist in trying to understand the big-picture sense of what they are involved in. Alan King, an Army officer, notes that he had always been told there was a plan for reconstruction; "I would get [it] when I needed it." But when the moment comes, the commanding officer levels with him: "You know, there's no plan; you have got to come up with something in 24 hours." A military policeman stationed at Abu Ghraib, Ken Davis, comments on what happened there. "I don't believe it was just a few bad apples. I'm not that gullible. I am not going to be lied to by a government that I would have given my life for in Iraq." Few of them see a point in the war.
The overall sense the book leaves is that of people with ants'-eye views of things describing what they saw and trying desperately to understand. Thus, What Was Asked of Us makes clear the fundamental paradox of war: It is an exercise that uses individuals in a way that transcends the individual. It seems that those involved in war can never understand it as a whole because their individual experiences are so vivid, as well as being so individual. Understanding, if it is ever achieved, is left to the people who start it, to those who order it from afar, or to the historians who explain it decades later from the silence of the university. And they did not fight it.
Certainly a video-game view of war is discredited here, that it is motivational, adrenaline-pumping, rock 'em, sock 'em good guys vs. bad guys. But the kind of people who read books such as this do not need to have this view discredited; they do not believe it to begin with. The view that it is only unpatriotic liberals who would question the war bites the dust too; one soldier, Garret Reppenhaben, mocks the "Support the Troops" magnetic ribbons by saying they "begin to look like swastikas."
This much of a polemical point is, at least, clear: Through its meticulous recreation of these voices, What Was Asked of Us opposes a view of war as something we should engage in because it will feel good for a moment to have the sense we are "doing something." We should, it is clear, resist saying, "They did X to us, so let's 'take the war to them.'" This book reminds us vividly that it is always people who take war anywhere, and people to whom it is taken. It is a point that we who theorize about war forget only at our peril. On 6 December 1941, the day before the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into World War II, foreign flags flew over every capital in Asia save three: those of Japan, Thailand, and Nepal. China was covered with all sorts of European and Japanese flags, Mongolia was a Soviet satellite, Korea and Taiwan were under Japanese rule, the Philippines was governed by the United States, Southeast Asia was under French, British, Dutch, and Portuguese rule, and most of South Asia was part of the British Empire.
In the Ruins of
Less than four years later, those flags started coming down after the Japanese surrendered to the Allied powers on the deck of the USS Missouri in Tokyo harbor on 2 September 1945. Japan, which had failed to accomplish its wartime objectives, had nonetheless broken the back of western colonialism in Asia. The Philippines ran up its flag in 1946, India and Pakistan broke from Britain in 1947, Burma and Sri Lanka became free from Britain in 1948, and Indonesia kicked out the Dutch in 1949. The French tried to hang on in Indochina but were defeated at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 only to be replaced by the Americans. Among the myriad of US mistakes in Vietnam was a failure to recognize that we were fighting the last of the anticolonial wars in Asia. The retreat of the West continued until 1999, when the Portuguese handed their colony in Macau back to China. The end of western colonialism and the emergence of sovereign, independent Asian states imbued with national pride from Seoul to Jakarta to Islamabad has been the single most vibrant force in this dynamic region for more than half a century. Against this backdrop, Ronald H. Spector's book In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle for Postwar Asia is disappointing as it does not live up to the promise of its imaginative title. The author touches on the historic changes that were the ultimate consequence of Japan's invasions and attempts to replace western imperialism with Japan's own. But he never really grasps the profound historical significance of what happened when the Japanese surrendered and were sent home and most western powers sought to roll the clock back to 1941. The United States, to its credit, had promised before the war that it would grant independence to the Philippines and kept that pledge on 4 July 1946.
Not until Spector, a historian at George Washington University, was well into his book, in Chapter 4, does he address the fundamental changes in Asia. He quotes General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of Allied forces in East Asia: "Today, freedom is on the offensive, democracy is on the march." Spector credits Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Allied commander in Southeast Asia, for seeing more clearly than most "that the world before Pearl Harbor and the fall of Singapore was gone forever." Mountbatten, he says, "believed in the vitality and endurance of the new forces of ethnic and national consciousness sweeping Asia even when he did not completely understand them." Spector, however, skims over much of that revolution as he focuses on a welter of details about who would take the surrender of Japanese troops in various parts of Asia, the political infighting within and among the Allied governments, and the vacillation of American policy. Additionally, the book is marred with basic errors: Nepal is identified on a map as Bhutan, the date of surrender aboard the USS Missouri is given as 8 September instead of 2 September, and the author asserts that former German SS men were refused enlistment in the French Foreign Legion when in fact the ranks of the Legion in Vietnam in 1955 were well sprinkled with them.
Even so, American soldiers of the Vietnam generation and later students of the war in Vietnam might read Spector's passages about Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese political leader, with great interest. The author reopens a debate over whether Ho was a nationalist who sought good relations with the United States or was a Communist lackey under the control of the Soviet Union. Spector notes that "Ho continued to address plaintive letters to [President Harry S.] Truman and Secretary of State James
Byrnes." The author asserts that at a dinner for US intelligence officers in September 1945, "Ho said that he could not understand why the principle of self-determination set forth in the Atlantic Charter and other Allied declarations should not apply to Vietnam and why the United States remained passive while the French and British re-erected the old colonial system." Historical speculation may be no more than an intriguing pastime, but wondering if a war could have been averted had the United States responded prudently to Ho Chi Minh might just be instructive. Richard Gabriel is the author of almost four dozen books, mainly on ancient warfare or biographies of ancient generals, although he has also written on military ethics, military psychiatry, and other topics. His latest offering shares much in common with his earlier work; however, it also represents growth in at least one important respect. For example, Gabriel has always been a great storyteller, and his biography of Scipio Africanus continues that tradition. He presents the Roman general's life in a style that is interesting and easy to read. In terms of growth, Scipio Africanus represents a recognition and acceptance of criticism. A 2005 review in the Journal of Military History of Gabriel's book on the ancient Israeli army criticized some of the scholarly aspects of that work. One of the reviewer's specific critiques was that Gabriel's research was "monolinguistic." In Scipio Africanus, Gabriel took that critique to heart and used sources in Latin, French, Italian, and German, as well as English. While in many respects this is a minor issue for the general reader who should nevertheless appreciate the resulting diversity of interpretation, academically it is an important step that will broaden Gabriel's acceptance in the specialized world of ancient history.
Since there is virtually no information available on Publius Cornelius Scipio's childhood, Gabriel opens his biography by describing what growing up was like for the typical ancient Roman of Scipio's high social status. As he became more involved in political and military affairs, the narrative becomes more focused on Scipio as an individual. Gabriel takes a long, but probably essential, detour to explain in some detail the Roman political and military systems that provided the context for Scipio's career, as well as the Carthaginian military system and Hannibal Barca, Scipio's primary enemy. The story returns to its focus and picks up pace as it progresses through the heart of Scipio's career when separating myth from reality is more difficult than acquiring information. This is the most significant and original part of the biography.
Gabriel weighs the ancient sources carefully and leavens them with common sense to reach plausible interpretations. Yet, the assertion of the subtitle that Scipio was "Rome's greatest general" is a stretch. He certainly rates very high on any list of Roman generals, but his fame rests primarily on the battles of Ilipa (Spain, 206 B.C.) and Zama (Africa, 202 B.C.). Ilipa was won by a carefully prepared tactical stratagem against Hasdrubal. Despite Gabriel's assertion that all the Carthaginian generals were excellent, there was a qualitative difference between Hannibal and the rest. The Ilipa maneuver was innovative and certainly exceptional in terms of contemporary Roman tactics, but in many respects it was like the Trojan horse; it worked once but can never be done in exactly the same manner. Regarding the Ilipa maneuver representing something new to warfare, the Spartans had done essentially the same thing (the difference being the Spartans maneuvered around one flank rather than two) against Athens and its allies at Nemea almost 200 years earlier. Scipio's signature victory at Zama was a close-run fight against a Hannibal whose army was a shadow of its former self. Gabriel's assertion that Scipio was trying to replicate the Ilipa maneuver is based entirely on speculation.
Both victories deserve acclaim, but as a body of work in a contest for "best general," they do not compare favorably to Caesar's entry. Gabriel pursues this whowas-the-better-general theme only in the concluding pages of his book, which overall is a readable and interesting account of one of the ancient world's great military leaders. The author states that many Americans had difficulty understanding al Qaeda because of myths that have been created about the organization through simplified analysis. In contrast to President Bush's assertion that they "hate us for our freedom," Riedel takes bin Laden at his word that the terrorist leader is not primarily interested in striking at the United States because of its secular democratic institutions or perceived tolerance of sexual promiscuity. Bin Laden has stated that if these were his priorities he would have attacked Sweden. Instead, Riedel views al Qaeda as having a well-developed ideology which includes a long list of political grievances against the West, particularly the United States. In al Qaeda's ideology, the worst sin of the West was helping to establish and then supporting the state of Israel at Palestinian expense.
Riedel also examines al Qaeda's goals and its political and military strategy for confronting the United States. He maintains that bin Laden fully understands that his forces cannot defeat the United States on its own soil. In recent years, bin Laden has only sought to conduct what he calls "raids" into the United States, such as 9/11. The 9/11 strike was correspondingly not meant as the opening shot of a war to be fought primarily within the United States. Rather, it was an attempt to lure Washington into attacking al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Bin Laden clearly expected that the United States could be defeated in Afghanistan just as the Soviet Union had been. Moreover, bin Laden attributed the collapse of the Soviet Union directly to its war in Afghanistan and assumed that the United States would face serious military and economic problems following a similar intervention there. US internal and especially economic problems brought on by the war would then lead desperate American leaders to withdraw support from Israel and pro-western Arab states, undermining the ability of these nations to survive.
In one of the most interesting parts of this study, Riedel examines key al Qaeda "franchises," the most important of which have been organizations in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The activities of these organizations are examined as part of al Qaeda's effort to become the most important resistance movement within the Islamic world. Fortunately, al Qaeda has so far failed in one of its most important goals, to assume leadership of the Palestinian struggle against Israel through an al Qaeda franchise which eclipses both Fatah and Hamas. In this regard, Riedel notes that Zawahiri had extensive experience with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood during his youth and that Hamas emerged from that group. This is a worrisome pedigree for both bin Laden and Zawahiri, who have consistently viewed both organizations as too soft on confronting Israel and too willing to accept compromise and accommodation, especially with the United States.
Riedel's final chapter outlines a new strategy for defeating al Qaeda. This strategy cannot be fully summarized in the limited space available for this review but nevertheless clearly flows from the author's previous analysis. The components of this strategy include strong US involvement in conflict resolution efforts directed at Israel, Palestine, other Arab parties, as well as India and Pakistan. The author's objective here is not to reform the irredeemable individuals within al Qaeda but to make their message less attractive by providing the Muslim community with "a better alternative than endless conflict." Riedel also supports political reform in the Middle East and notes the importance of the emerging democracy in Pakistan. He calls for an "orderly, phased, and complete US withdrawal from Iraq." Some bureaucratic issues are also dealt with in this chapter with an eye toward improving intelligence capabilities and more clearly delineating organizational responsibilities in opposing al Qaeda.
In summary, the useful information, wide-ranging knowledge, and important insight within this short book are extremely impressive. A reader cannot help thinking that US leaders were well-served by Riedel's advice throughout his years in government (even in cases where it was not heeded). While there have been numerous books on international terrorism and al Qaeda since 9/11, few have done such a masterful job of presenting essential knowledge about the organization in such a correspondingly insightful, detailed, and straightforward way. This book by a gifted analyst and strategist deserves the attention of readers seeking a strategic outlook. When Bing West asked General George Casey what the lesson for the US Army was from the war in Iraq, General Casey said, "I used to believe if we soldiers could do conventional war, we could do anything. That's not true. In conventional battle, we maneuver to avoid the civilian population. In future wars, we have to prevail among the people. That changes everything." In 1961, however, when the Army was on the verge of escalating its commitment to fight insurgents in the jungles of Vietnam, the Army Chief of Staff at the time, General George Decker, observed that "any good soldier can handle guerrillas."
In his most recent work, The Strongest Tribe, Bing West provides an incisively candid and masterful account of the trials, tribulations, blood, sweat, and toil that the US military endured in Iraq while adapting from a force optimized for regular, conventional war to one capable of prevailing in irregular warfare, or counterinsurgency. This outstanding contribution to the history of the Iraq War testifies to the veracity of the Casey quotation and affirms the speciousness of the second. The Strongest Tribe recounts in captivating detail how the US military fought the war in Iraq; how it ultimately adapted its tactics, organization, and doctrine to counterinsurgency warfare; and what lessons the American government and military should learn from Iraq.
The book is generally comprised of two main parts. The early chapters describe the strategic mistakes and operational missteps during the first three years of the war. The second half explains the turnaround that began in earnest in 2006 as a result of the US military learning counterinsurgency under fire, manifested by its ability to secure the population by changing its operational approach and by employing indigenous forces. As a Marine combat veteran, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, and war correspondent with 14 extended trips to Iraq, Bing West is certainly qualified to write this book. He is also the author of the seminal Vietnam counterinsurgency classic, The Village, which still has salience for combined action with indigenous forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Success in Iraq ultimately stemmed from a bottom-up, decentralized approach that empowered battalion and company commanders to adapt to local conditions. The latter is where the strength of this enthralling history lies, as it recounts the crucial roles of battalion and company leaders who demonstrated the ingenuity to succeed in spite of the colossal hubris and blunders that characterized the strategic-and operational-level conduct of the early part of the war. West does not pull any punches as he extols the former and vilifies the latter.
The first chapters of The Strongest Tribe catalog those strategic and military shortcomings that precluded the planning, recognition, and prosecution of a strategy for anticipating and countering the emergent insurgency in Iraq for the first three years. Long-standing Pentagon strategic planning guidance that focused on fighting and quickly winning large conventional wars contributed to the lack of adequate planning for the occupation that followed the fall of Baghdad. "For decades, the military had designed force-planning guidance that emphasized fighting and swiftly winning a major war, then withdrawing quickly to be ready to fight somewhere else." This strategic guidance guaranteed that the US military budget funded conventional warfighting formations while neglecting the forces needed for counterinsurgency operations.
West asserts President George W. Bush had recused himself from the strategic management of the war, and his top generals possessed no special expertise in fighting an insurgency like the one that developed in Iraq. "None had led troops in battle against guerrillas prior to Iraq." The generals were learning counterinsurgency in real time as the war progressed, a direct result of the US military eschewing counterinsurgency and its supporting doctrine after Vietnam. The aforementioned resulted in contradictory notions about how to prosecute the war at the strategic level, resulting in military forces that were neither organized nor doctrinally prepared to conduct counterinsurgency when the insurgency unfolded. Since much of the top-down guidance and planning during the first part of the war was mislaid, Marines and soldiers were compelled to adapt from the bottom up. This strategy continued until late 2006, when bottom-up tactical innovations for employing indigenous irregular forces converged with a change in the campaign framework.
This book is an exceedingly readable and informative account of the Iraq War. West includes an Appendix that lists his own inferences for the counterinsurgency lessons from Iraq. The most notable of these, and the most relevant to Afghanistan and this long irregular war, is to "partner always." To amass a sufficient number of counterinsurgent forces to secure the population and establish the rule of law, it is imperative to leverage regular and irregular forces from among the indigenous people to conduct combined police actions and counterinsurgency operations. "If a US unit is not combined with a local unit, it cannot succeed." The other problem the author reveals during the initial years of the conflict in Iraq was that "offensive sallies followed by a rest period on a [Forward Operating Base] contradicted the basic counterinsurgency precept of holding the populated areas." Until 2006, counterinsurgency may have existed as a notion, but the US battalions continued to "do what they knew best: sweeps, mounted patrols, and targeted raids at night."
Counterinsurgency is all about the people: protecting the population; persuading the population to be on your side; persisting among the population by leveraging portions of it to combine with the Coalition to provide security and services; persuading insurgents to quit the fight by isolating them from the population; and defeating or turning them. It also requires protecting the population from counterinsurgent forces by enforcing and exhibiting due moral rectitude, through the precise and discriminatory application of the correct amount of force. These are the lessons that remain relevant to the imminent effort to win back the rural areas in eastern and southern Afghanistan. Kill Bin Laden is one of the latest books to join the growing collection of firsthand accounts from the veterans of Afghanistan and Iraq. This genre has had mixed commercial and critical success, with this recent addition among the most successful. Although some journalistic accounts have been highly successful (perhaps Generation Kill is among the most noteworthy), it is rare for veterans' accounts to have such a commercial impact. Dalton Fury's account of the Tora Bora battle shares many of the same qualities as Nate Fick's One Bullet Away, an engaging account of Fick's time as a platoon leader in a Marine reconnaissance unit that was among the first deployed in both Afghanistan and Iraq.
Both books introduce readers to America's elite special operations forces by relating stories of their harsh training, their unique missions in today's conflicts, and the exceptional men serving within them. Kill Bin Laden brings the reader into the secretive world of Delta Force, and in the "Acknowledgments," Fury relates the difficulties of publishing this book. The Special Operations Command never gave its approval for publication. Aside from navigating the ultimately inconclusive legal process, Fury (a pseudonym) has also risked the ire of his comrades-in-arms, whose culture of "quiet professionalism" strongly frowns upon any sort of "tell all" publication.
The book is engaging, a well-written and readable "page turner." One other striking quality of Kill Bin Laden is its strong research, referring the reader to some of the best books on whatever subject Fury is discussing at the moment. This is especially true at the beginning, which contains more background information than the more narrative remainder, but the level of scholarship continues throughout the book. As the story nears the end of the battle, in which Fury describes the fierce day-to-day fighting in Tora Bora in December 2001, this reviewer thought back to Peter Bergen's The Osama bin Laden I Know. Bergen quoted bin Laden's 14 December will, which he wrote as death seemed inevitable. Continuing to read further into Kill Bin Laden, when Fury is assessing the question of whether the terrorist leader was actually at Tora Bora, he refers to that exact point from Bergen's book.
The entire book is poignant and compelling. Fury and his team are a real band of brothers-in-arms. The description of his selection, bittersweet departure, and transition to a National Guard adviser make it clear how special to him was his membership in this elite element. His return to the unit and his admiring description of his colleagues further emphasize his feelings. Kill Bin Laden's fast-paced description of the battle and realistic portrayal of the allied Afghan warlords General Hazret Ali and Haji Zaman Ghamshareek are additional virtues of the book. Finally, the candid discussion of the operational failures and poor interoperability of American forces will make the volume a valuable contribution to lessons learned. Among the failures Fury documents are the surprisingly cautious resistance from the Green Berets and the Rangers to commit supporting forces when their assistance was requested for the bin Laden hunt.
As with every book, there are, of course, concerns from the reviewer's perspective. In spite of the author's personal humility, the narrative of Kill Bin Laden often obscures the fact that bin Laden did escape. It is reminiscent of Vietnam War books that emphasize the tactical successes over the strategic debacle that resulted in serious setbacks for the stature of both the nation's foreign policy and its armed forces for years. Even within one paragraph the author contradicts himself; the operation "must be viewed as a military failure . . . . Without a doubt, a tremendous tactical victory . . . partially successful operationally." On the following page he writes, "Usama bin Laden ran away. Even the staunchest critics might find difficulty in classifying this as anything but a success."
Three recurring themes emphasize this contradiction: constant praise lavished on Fury's comrades-in-arms, the implicit criticism of higher headquarters for repeated bad decisions (even though these officers are also from America's special operations community), and criticism of bin Laden's decision to flee. The latter trend is the most problematic. In spite of all Major Fury's references to bin Laden's reputation as the lion of Islam and to Mohammed's legendary battles against overwhelming odds, the failure to anticipate that the enemy would flee to fight another day is a major cause of the failure to kill bin Laden.
Another surprise is that Fury is so critical that the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) failed to capture learnings from Tora Bora. This reviewer does agree with the author that there are important lessons to learn. The apparent cause, however-since Fury's unit is not officially recognized to exist-is more likely the classified nature of the mission and the unit rather than negligence from CALL or by the Army.
Altogether, the book was brilliant. The author has a talent for writing. Readers should be pleased that this recently retired Special Forces officer overcame all of the obstacles inherent in writing a book, mobilizing the time and energy to complete such a vast project and then navigating the difficult commercial publishing world, as well as those particular to his situation due to the special nature of Delta Force and its mission. This book is among the best accounts by military veterans that have been published since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq began. It is a great story, and Dalton Fury was the right man to tell it. Anyone with an interest in World War II, both the novice as well as the informed reader, will find this book a valuable reference text. Companions derive their name from the function they perform. As with a companion who accompanies you on a journey, guiding your way and calling your attention to points of interests, The Library of Congress World War II Companion "considers the world's greatest conflict from the beginning of full-scale combat in Asia in July 1937 through the Japanese surrender in August 1945," highlighting as it does countless interesting insights that contribute to one's understanding of the conflict.
Unlike The Oxford Companion to World War II, which resembles an encyclopedia, with entries on individuals, operations, equipment, and so on, The Library of Congress World War II Companion covers the war thematically in 12 chapters that read more like essays than entries in a reference text. Chapter topics overlap, with information on most subjects covered in several places. For example, information on home-front activities will be found in the chapters on "Wartime Politics," "Mobilization," "War Crimes and the Holocaust," and "The Underground War," in addition to the obvious location, a chapter titled "War on the Home Front." Strategy and tactics are covered in chapters on "Military Leadership and Organization" and "Instruments of War." Two chapters are devoted to military operations, one covering the period 1937-41 and the other 1942-45. Given the thematic format, the reader will find the comprehensive Index a welcome complement to the Table of Contents. The book is interesting on many levels, both for what is included and what is not. For example, the Index has an entry for the "zoot suit riot," but not one for unconditional surrender. Although one does find mention of "unconditional surrender" in several entries on the Casablanca Conference, it is noted only in passing, which is odd since unconditional surrender as a war aim was so central to Allied grand strategy. In a similar vein, the Index does not list "strategy" or "grand strategy" as topics. One does find an entry for "Orange plan," but there is no listing for the Rainbow plans. The Rainbow plans are mentioned in passing in the section on Plan Orange. A reader searching for a summary of the grand strategies pursued by the various belligerents must either begin with a good working idea of what one is looking for or wait to discover the information almost serendipitously. Indeed, a major shortcoming in what is otherwise an interesting overview of the war is the lack of a coherent and yet succinct summary of the grand strategies of any of the combatant nations.
The narrative includes numerous lists and tables that summarize subjects such as "Major Inter-Allied Conferences, 1941 Conferences, -1945 ," "Production of Weapons and Military Vehicles by Country, 1939 Country, -1945 and "Nazi Extermination Camps and Major Concentration Camps." This last, for example, provides information on the location of the camp, months or years of operation, numbers killed, and so on. Maps, photographs, and interviews drawn from the Library of Congress's extensive holdings add to the interest and utility of the Companion.
Several of the chapters reflect the excellent use of the Library's vast archives and the expertise of researchers and writers. For example, the chapter on "War Crimes and the Holocaust" is remarkable for its richness and complexity. Although the section on the Holocaust spans a mere 40 pages, it reflects the best of what the Companion has to offer. There is an excellent, annotated timeline that marks the onset of what eventually became the Holocaust with the opening of Dachau in 1933 and runs to May 1945. Text boxes embedded throughout the narrative define terms ("holocaust, meaning 'burnt offering'"), include lists of statistics (e.g., number of Jewish immigrants from Germany, 1933-38 and the countries to which they fled), the colors and shapes of badges worn by prisoners (inverted triangles or Stars of David, pink for homosexuals, yellow for Jews), and so on. One of the larger text boxes lists the major extermination and concentration camps with populations during the war and numbers killed or who died of maltreatment while incarcerated. One may read the narrative uninterrupted, scan the text boxes, or both as time and interest permit. Chapters end with a list of principal sources and suggested titles for further reading.
All too frequently one hears the question, "What's the best single book on [fill in the blank]?" Generally one must deflect that question, especially when the subject is WWII, an event which by almost any measure must be considered the most cataclysmic in modern times, if not in all of recorded history. Literally thousands of books have been written on the war since 1945, and with each year the number grows. That said, given the thematic format, the excellent writing, and the comprehensive scope of the work, The Library of Congress World War II Companion deserves a place on any short list of recommendations titled "best single book" on WWII. Well-balanced essays demonstrate the value Halleck, Meade, Wright, and Thomas brought to the war effort, and Mark Grimsley suggests that even Butler performed a useful role by holding 20,000 Confederates in Richmond, but author after author hints or argues that Grant should have exerted greater control over the men entrusted with executing his strategy.
A second major theme is Grant as a strategist, and his disagreements over strategy with other generals and the Lincoln Administration. In a sense, historians are replicating the strategic debates of the war itself, between those who sought to concentrate overwhelming force along a single axis from Washington south to Richmond, those advocating an advance up the Peninsula, or an approach south of the James River to cut supplies to Richmond and the Army of Northern Virginia. Ethan Rafuse, the most balanced biographer of George McClellan, affirms the latter approach in his essay on Meade, observing that Grant came to share McClellan's vision of campaign strategy. John F. Marszalek notes Grant's uneven support for Sherman's marches through Georgia and the Carolinas. The commanding general worried about leaving John Bell Hood in Sherman's rear and wanted Sherman to bring his army to join the siege of Petersburg once he reached Savannah. Benjamin F. Cooling and Mark Grimsley question Grant's move to the south side of the James River and his focus on Petersburg, at the expense of covering the axis between Richmond and Washington against the Confederate counterthrust under Jubal Early.
Grant erred in losing sight of events outside his immediate vicinity, but it is difficult to dispute the war-winning value of his offensive vision and sense of focus. (Teachers of military history and strategy can still find much food for thought in the parallel dilemmas, of concentration vs. "broad fronts" and "peripheral operations," found in the Civil War and the World Wars.) Throughout 1862 and 1863, the "headquarters doctrine" of defending Washington by an advance directly south failed to do more than cover the capital, repeatedly ceding the initiative to Robert E. Lee. In 1864, this approach denied Grant the option of striking at the Confederate breadbasket in North Carolina, or of moving rapidly to siege operations via the Peninsula, while pressing him to fight battles against an enemy his army was too large and cumbersome to outmaneuver, leading to the frontal assaults at Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor that so many observers consider characteristic of his generalship.
The ultimate issue Grant's Lieutenants poses is the role of the general-inchief or army group commander. How closely should he oversee subordinates? Should he be chief of staff, as Halleck became even when he was titled general-inchief, coordinating resources in support of the vision of the commander-in-chief, and "translating political considerations to commanders in the field"? This was essentially the role of the Army's commanding general prior to the Civil War, but Grant had observed a different example in Winfield Scott's command in Mexico and may have assumed that Halleck, Secretary of War Stanton, and the President would do more to exercise control over theaters outside the area of his offensive focus. Unfortunately, neither Lincoln nor Halleck was given to issuing specific positive orders until a situation became dire.
There is a trade-off between breadth and depth of oversight and direction; we can condemn Grant for going too far in one direction, but we should also criticize Halleck for not taking more responsibility for the theaters Grant was not focused on. (Nor had Halleck proven any more decisive in 1862; he should bear as much blame as Pope or McClellan for Second Manassas.) Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck may have put too much faith in Grant, creating expectations-that Grant would provide the direction and decision that they did not, across the entire Eastern Theater-that no one individual could meet. As Cooling observes, this was a "learning period for Grant," and there was "too much suggesting, too much discretion on everyone's part."
Cooling rightly identifies a pattern in Grant's generalship of underestimating and being surprised by his enemies. But his assertion that Early's advance "confounded Grant's summer plans, earning . . . nine extra months . . . for the Army of Northern Virginia" seems greatly exaggerated, as is Grimsley's that operating south of the James River "led only to a ten-month siege." Nor is Cooling persuasive that Grant "nearly lost both the national capital and the war" by losing sight of Early. Historians need to examine the dynamics of electoral politics more closely before asserting that the nation was "teetering," or the Republicans were on the verge of defeat in the 1864 elections. The attrition created by the siege of Petersburg was the decisive factor in the destruction of Lee's ability to resist, and it was Grant who initiated and persisted in that siege. Woodworth wisely observes that George Thomas "responded to the pressure [of command] by resorting to compulsive perfectionism," trying to cover all the details and all the bases. Indeed, this was the norm among Union generals, whose operations were continually driven by enemy actions or threats of action. For all his flaws, Grant did not make this mistake; executing McClellan's strategy with Grant's grit proved a winning combination. Affirming General Charles Krulak's description of a "three-block war," Mansoor's account clearly reveals the complex and diverse conditions US forces encountered in Iraq. He informs his readers of the ethnic, religious, economic, and political divisions that beset a population cowed by the former regime and left to operate without the modern vestiges of civil society. The brigade soon found itself filling the vacuum of authority as it performed such tasks as restoring public schools and arbitrating tribal disputes. The author offers detailed accounts of the brigade's interaction with neighborhood associations, tribal leaders, local media, and the emerging Iraqi security forces-activities essential to gaining credibility and wresting control and influence from insurgents.
Mansoor describes events that are little known outside of the uniformed services, such as the extraordinary efforts of US commanders to uphold the Law of War while prosecuting combat. He details deliberate efforts to shape the command climate of the unit, including nonjudicial punishment and command inquiries into suspected misconduct. The author makes his readers poignantly aware of the stresses of long deployments on families and the burdens of those who await the return of loved ones.
Although skillfully written, Mansoor's memoir is not without some faults. Richly benefited by hindsight, the prose, at times, becomes a bit defensive. Moreover, the author occasionally reaches beyond a personal memoir and unit history. For example, his assessment of the Coalition Provisional Authority lacking "stomach" to lift price controls or "allowing [Muqtada] Sadr to survive" ignores the complexity of the strategic environment and detracts from the quality of the book.
Despite these minor shortcomings, the memoir provides insight into critical policy debates about the war in Iraq and broader implications regarding war in the twenty-first century. As the repository of tactical excellence and the units producing the Army's most promising emerging leaders, brigade combat teams are especially well-led and fully resourced. The author successfully demonstrates and asserts "the US Army discovered Iraq was in many important respects a brigade commander's war, for this was the first echelon at which all the elements of staff synchronization came together to prosecute the counterinsurgency fight."
The combat brigades attracted political notoriety during the "Surge" and national election debates as their departure from Iraq has come to be a measure of success for the United States. Mansoor's portrayal of the brigades' vital role in counterinsurgency and stability operations, to say nothing of their additional missions of commanding transition teams and peacemaking, raises the question of how these functions will be performed as the United States continues to withdraw combat brigades.
This book contributes to current deliberations on the kind of Army we will need for the wars of the twenty-first century. The author ends his memoir with recommendations for organizational change to enhance the brigade-level unit and for Army cultural change to rebalance traditional warfighting skills. Strategists need to balance current requirements for victory in Iraq and Afghanistan while shaping and training the force to confront future threats. Indeed, the future environment requires close scrutiny as assumptions proliferate about the balance of regular, irregular, and hybrid opponents the United States will face. Mansoor provides important firsthand evidence of the nature of one of those types of war.
This well-written memoir shares details of the Iraq War that few outside the military are aware of. It provides a focused glimpse of the complexity of modern war that will be helpful to defense professionals at every level. Finally, it is the first in what will ideally become a mosaic of mid-level command memoirs from recent conflicts. The idea of limits is no small matter since some in the ranks are crusading into the future armed with the belief that the American Army can "change entire societies." The recent experience in Iraq and with the Surge has convinced a group of true believers that the American military is unstoppable and can accomplish any mission in any part of our unstable world.
Bacevich argues that recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan expose as "illusory American pretensions to having mastered war." The Limits of Power is a call for humility, a call to get back to basics, a call to reconnect the American people with their military and the government that conducts war. These reconnections have to be made, according to Bacevich, because the "central paradox" of our times is that while defending American freedom seems to require more interventions abroad, the very culture of freedom in the United States-or a culture of mass consumption-undermines the ability to carry out the crusade for freedom in a volatile and evolving world.
The book is broken into three extended essays that explain discrete and related "crises." The first is "The Crisis of Profligacy." Bacevich notes that if one word was selected to characterize today's America it would be "more." The author is a historian, and he grounds the book in a textured and scholarly understanding of American history. So when he uses the word "more" he provides a clear historical path to how we got to where we are today. Abundance-or having lots of material things (land, money, products, etc.)-has always been a condition of American history, with links to the nation's conduct abroad. But Bacevich shows how the condition of abundance has turned into a belief that having "more" is an entitlement that has come to define American freedom. To maintain the "more" the United States has committed itself to a foreign policy premised on the need for an unending supply of Middle Eastern oil. This unquenchable demand for foreign energy, however, came at the same time that the United States, following the Vietnam War, could no longer produce the national power required to carry out that policy.
In order to resolve this basic contradiction the nation needs its political system to function efficiently. Unfortunately, as Bacevich explains in the next section, "Political Crisis," it does not. The dysfunction of the current American political system makes it incapable of reining in the culture of consumption and bringing US foreign policy goals in line with the limits of its power. The dysfunction revolves around the Congress's abdication of its constitutional duty in the conduct of war and the design of foreign policy. In one paragraph Bacevich delivers a scathing critique of the Bush Administration and its dysfunctional political system. He argues as specious the notion that:
. . . the forty-third President has broken decisively with the past, setting the United States on a revolutionary new course. Yet this is poppycock . . . . Bush's main achievement has been to articulate that ideology with such fervor and clarity as to unmask as never before its defects and utter perversity.
The perversity being the existential commitment of American military power in the world's troubled spots while internally the United States can no longer afford these military adventures.
Bacevich's third section on the "Military Crisis" that America faces aims to pull away the curtain that conceals the truth of the Wizard of Oz. He lays bare the foolhardiness of believing that these military adventures can succeed if this method is modified, or if the draft is reinstated, or if those pesky civilian masters would just start listening to their generals, or the right generals are picked to lead. Yet all of this is a chimera. In fact, the essential point of this last section, which the US Army should pay close attention to, is the hubristic notion that war itself can be mastered by means of clever doctrine and superior generals. It cannot, and the facade of such thinking has to be removed if we are to reveal the limits of what military power can accomplish.
The Limits of Power resonates from the author's historical sensibility, his keen eye regarding American culture, and his appreciation of those limits that can only come from study, reflection, and experience. Sadly, Bacevich understands the cost of doing business this way. He dedicates the book to his son, Andrew John Bacevich, First Lieutenant, US Army who was killed in action in Iraq on 13 May 2007. So when Bacevich asks, "What costs does the exercise of freedom impose [and] who pays?" he knows the answer, as a scholar and as a father.
War is not a game. It is not a social-science project conducted by experts, but instead as the great Prussian philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz teaches, it is a serious means to a serious ends, and it has costs. Bacevich's book seeks to develop a direct conversation with the American people, political leadership, and military regarding what the United States has become and how we need to put our house back in order. Professor Fogarty's interest in the topic and his significant previous scholarship provided the opportunity to transform his Ph.D. dissertation into an eminently readable and coherent book on a subject that is sensitive even 90 years after the events. His research and publications over the past decade have focused on the themes of World War I, religion, race relations, and colonialism. This latest book provides the reader with a thorough description of France's use of almost half a million colonial soldiers and the difficulties the French government faced.
Race and War in
The Introduction provides a solid setting for the seven chapters and conclusion that follow. Professor Fogarty quickly addresses the quirks of translation. One term he defines well and uses repeatedly is indigene, which refers to colonial forces, whether in the colonies (and thus they are "indigenous"), or in the theaters of war (when they are certainly not "indigenous").
The author presents strong arguments related to the conflicting dimensions of the Third Republic. Having come to power after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the staunchly republican governments worked to balance conflicting pressures. One such pressure was vigorous colonial expansion (encouraged by the British and German examples) and the attitudes and policies it generated. As France acquired its new empire, it ruled either through assimilation (if the indigènes became linguistically and cultur-ally French they could become French citizens) or association (the indigènes retained much of their own culture and were partners-albeit junior partners-with France). Fogarty introduces these two distinctly opposite systems well and employs them throughout the book. Another pressure emanated from the theories of human rights as set out in the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen" (adopted in France in August 1789, two years before the US Bill of Rights). These rights contradicted the concepts of establishing overseas colonies and treating people of color as second-class persons. Fogarty describes these incongruities with clarity and substance.
Although the author does not dwell on the history of WWI (providing only one map of France), he highlights the need for large numbers of indigenes and explains how the French government and military, often based on racial stereotypes, separated those who are "warrior-type" (les races guerrières) and those who are not (les races non-guerrières). The case is well-supported that those who are warriors are destined to be so based on their ethnicity, and their role in the war was mostly on the front. Yet even these forces were often viewed as inept to perform technical tasks or serve as leaders due to their perceived racial inferiority or lack of French-language skills. Fogarty dedicates an entire chapter to these issues. He dwells on the inadequate language proficiency of many of the indigenes being a result of inadequate schooling either in the colonies or in the language training provided to soldiers in France.
The book makes a forceful case regarding Islam and the efforts made by the French to accommodate their Muslim North African troops. Throughout the Third Republic, France had been ruled by strongly secular governments. Fogarty goes to great lengths to document the efforts made to deal with issues of faith among the colonized peoples of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia who were fighting for France. The complexities of prayer, holy days, funerals, mosques, and the rights and obligations of citizenship are effectively described. Fogarty clearly depicts the challenges posed by the "statut personnel" of many Muslims, whereby they retained the application of Shari'a law while enjoying limited benefits of association under the French colonial regimes.
In the chapter on "Race, Sex, and Imperial Anxieties," the author convincingly explains the conflict between republican ideals and the concepts of colonial power. While fraternization between the troupes indigènes and French women may have been accepted under the precepts evolving from the French Revolution, it also unsettled the colonial order when African forces returned home. Fogarty describes these issues in a thorough and tasteful manner.
Fogarty concludes his narrative by bringing together the various elements detailed in earlier chapters. He reviews the conflicts and complexities faced by the French authorities in trying to provide troops to fight a war. The climate is cold and inhospitable; for many the language is alien; the customs and traditions are foreign; and the military hierarchy often fails to recognize skill and leadership among the troupes indigènes and deprives them of awards, promotions, or advancement. Fogarty describes a nation where the racial attitudes, colonial policies, and wartime decisions were often contradictory. Frenchmen who served in the colonies and wanted to maintain the colonial status quo after the war were often at odds with liberal-thinking republicans who believed in the equality of the troupes indigènes. The inability of the French to reconcile these fundamental differences sowed the seeds of decolonization and the end of the French empire a few decades later. Fogarty provides readers with a solid review of the challenges of war, human rights, and colonialism in a very readable and well-documented book. This is an extremely well-researched and fascinating book, albeit one that comes across as somewhat impressionistic in its depiction of what was a very confused and confusing Nazi regime. Mark Mazower in no way revises our normal picture of the Nazi occupations as the most murderous and brutal of experiences. He does, however, bring out a host of contradictions in the way Hitler ran his dictatorship, with a potential blurring of what were the real causes of the misery Europe experienced from 1939 to 1945, amid some possibly controversial and interesting lessons about modes of reprisal and repression, in response to resistance movements.
Consistent with many earlier histories of the period, the author shows how uncoordinated the Nazi regime was, by Hitler's deliberate design. While the Nazi approach was always selfish in putting German material well-being ahead of that of any other ethnic group, one finds numerous policy disagreements and bureaucratic turf contests, with some of the peoples conquered by the Germans (the Czechs and Slovaks, Danes and Norwegians, and West Europeans in general) getting far easier treatment than the Poles and Soviet nationalities. Mazower shows important continuities where Nazi behavior can be linked to earlier German brutality and where German ethnic struggles with the Poles and Czechs had a long history, but he alternates this with repeated references to the differences between Germany's World War I and World War II occupations of Poland.
Relevant to military policy, the book largely debunks the memories of extensive French, Belgian, etc. resistance to the Nazis. The author's sad bottom-line is that policies of harsh reprisals often succeeded in cowing local opposition, with the Danes, French, Dutch, and Czechs being important economic contributors to the German war effort. Even inside the Soviet Union, where Nazi policy was much harsher, the numbers of German forces tied up in keeping the rear areas under control were always surprisingly small.
Mazower gives some fascinating insights into how even Heinrich Himmler's Schutzstaffel (SS) was not monolithic but divided into factions, as well as being at odds with the leadership of the Nazi party, with Hitler tolerating the divisions. A portion of the SS is portrayed as a relatively profound think tank, rather than simply part of a witless commitment to Aryan superiority, with Werner Best, the rival to Reinhard Heydrich, even getting away with some not too subtle public criticisms of Himmler and Hitler.
Also relevant to today's policy choices, the author shows that some of the brutality of German occupations was due to the simple economic costs of Europe being at war, intensified by the very effective British and Allied blockade. The starving victims of the regime we remember from photographs were at times the result of Nazi sadism and hate, and at other times simply the result of there not being enough food. Anyone contemplating "economic warfare" and blockades and sanctions today, as an alternative to more violent warfare, has to be reminded that both World War I and World War II involved very painful applications of such sanctions. Mazower also allows himself to speculate about whether Hitler and the Nazis ever had any vision of a united Europe that would offer their allies and their conquests any hope for the future, noting how a few of the Nazis saw a need for this, but with nothing clear ever being generated.
The book is long and replete with detail, including aggregations of data and anecdotal material that simultaneously support the normal view of Hitler and the Nazis but also often complicates it. The allies of the Germans are sometimes shown as less hateful and genocidal than the Nazis, but in other cases come across as just as brutal, as indeed do the French or the Czechs sometimes after the war. Mazower lays blame on Nazi ideology, but also on more traditional nationalism and its conflicts, and at times simply on the dictates of the situation, where brutal reprisals indeed inhibited resistance, and where resources were short.
The book alternates between conflicting and even opposing generalizations, as in an impressionistic painting, with each clear line being contradicted by other clear lines, but with this explication quite appropriate to the conflicting nature of the Nazi approach.
Given how many corners of history are explored so interestingly and well by the author, there are some surprising gaps. There is a reference to Nazi reprisal policies against partisans in various nations, including Finland. It is hard to fathom what this is referring to. A discussion of General Alexander von Falkenhausen, the wartime military governor of Belgium (who applied a relatively relaxed approach and thus experienced relatively little resistance), describes him as a "worldly" former military attaché in Turkey, Japan, and China. But this misses the fact Falkenhausen had indeed been the head of a major German military training mission aiding Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalist forces in their struggle against the Japanese, until he and his team were forced in 1938 to come home by Hitler. The very interesting discussion of Werner Best similarly makes no reference to the possibility that Best is one of the people suspected of leaking to the Danes the plans for the arrest of the Danish Jews, plans preempted when most of these people were gotten safely across to Sweden.
If anyone thinks that nothing new can be written on World War II, or that no lessons for the future can be extracted from this experience, this book is surely an antidote. Although Adolf Hitler made a strategic blunder in invading the Soviet Union, at the operational and tactical levels he chose the best possible time to attack. The Red Army of 1941 was not only suffering from a massive purge of its leadership, but also was caught in transition between different doctrines, organizations, defensive positions, and generations of weaponry. Josef Stalin was aware of many of these weaknesses, and therefore forbad defensive deployments that might provide Hitler with a pretext to attack. This desire to delay the inevitable conflict only condemned his forces to even greater losses.
Yet, while Army Groups North and Center easily penetrated and encircled the defending Soviet units, Army Group South experienced greater difficulty in attacking south of the Pripet Marshes. Unknown to the Germans, the Soviet Southwestern Front included eight huge mechanized corps that between them totaled 5,550 tanks and armored cars, more than the entire inventory of German armor on the Eastern Front.
Victor Kamenir, a Russian immigrant and veteran of the US Army, has attempted to describe and explain the resulting clashes on the border of the Ukraine. After analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the two belligerents, he provides a day-by-day account of the fighting, using sources from both sides but relying primarily on Soviet memoirs and records.
Kamenir particularly focuses on the leadership deficiencies of the Red officer corps. Because of the purges, some Soviet commanders had been promoted beyond their levels of experience, while others had just emerged from the prison camps of Siberia. The Soviet headquarters in Moscow, supplemented on the spot by political commissars with no military knowledge, constantly second-guessed these commanders and inhibited their clumsy efforts to maneuver the half-formed mechanized units. While German reconnaissance units easily identified weak spots in the Soviet defenses, their counterparts were ineffective, forcing commanders to send staff officers in tanks or in some cases entire divisions to search for their elusive foes. Soviet divisions and corps that were supposed to conduct coordinated counterattacks instead dissipated their combat power in disjointed small-unit efforts. Similarly, despite the legend that it was destroyed on the ground, the Red Air Force flew hundreds of missions during the first few days of the battle, but lacked the organization to coordinate operations effectively.
Equipment problems were equally galling, as Kamenir repeatedly demonstrates. Most of the motorized infantry lacked trucks, and headquarters had many communication deficiencies. Most significant, hundreds of new T-34 medium and KV-1 heavy tanks were mixed in with thousands of obsolescent and often worn-out older tanks, the products of Moscow's efforts in the mid-1930s. Although many of the German tanks were underarmored Panzer I and IIs, they were still more capable than, for example, the Soviet 8th Mechanized Corps, which had 142 inoperable tanks out of a total of 858.
Despite all these handicaps, the infantry and armored units of the Soviet Southwestern Front put up a valiant if disjointed fight, impeding the German advance throughout the first week of the war before finally withdrawing to defend farther east. Many of the Red Army's most effective and famous commanders, such as Konstantin Rokossovsky (commander of the 9th Mechanized Corps) and Mikhail Katukov (commander of Rokossovsky's 20th Tank Division), learned their first lessons in battle command during the border battles of 1941.
The author has performed an excellent job in the complex task of reconstructing events and explaining the defeat of the Red tank force. Kamenir has used many sources long neglected in the West, although attentive readers may have difficulty tracing those sources. For example, his footnotes frequently refer cryptically to "Sbornik," presumably the many-volumed Sbornik voenno-istoricheskikh materialov Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny [Collection of military-historical materials of the Great Patriotic War], yet the bibliography uses only the English title of this classic source.
The text could also benefit from an effective editor. Mr. Kamenir's excellent research is sometimes obscured by the inevitable difficulties of writing in his second language, resulting in numerous instances where words are missing or incorrect.
These minor flaws aside, however, this book is well worth the time of the general reading audience and senior military leaders. The Bloody Triangle is not just a contribution to the growing revisionist literature concerning the Soviet-German conflict; it is also a parable of the difficulties that military organizations suffer when they are caught in transition from one doctrine and force structure to another. Pearlman, a former professor at the US Army Command and General Staff College, is well-suited to write this story; indeed, it is a case study in detail of the argument presented in his earlier work, Warmaking and American Democracy, on the pell-mell and often incoherent nature of policy-and strategy-making in the United States. As such, this is not the stereotypical great man history, the story of the Korean War told through the lens of a few seemingly all-powerful puppet masters. The full ambiguity of the intersections of personalities, politics, foreign policy, national military strategy, and theater strategy is on display. The familiar names-Truman, MacArthur, Mao Tse-tung, Josef Stalin, Kim Il-sung, Dean Acheson, George Kennan, Matthew Ridgway, Dwight Eisenhower-are all here, but so too are Chiang Kai-shek, Edward Almond, Arthur Vandenberg, Robert Taft, Richard Russell, Frank Lowe, Averill Harriman, James Reston, Walter Lippmann, Omar Bradley, Joe Collins, George C. Marshall, Forrest Sherman, Joe Martin, Sun Li-jen, Frank Pace, Charles Willoughby, and Joseph McCarthy, to name just a few. These individuals, their constituencies, and their organizations (to include the State Department, Department of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Council, Far Eastern Command, and so on) all have a voice. Simple this story most assuredly is not; no one or two actors are calling the shots. Call it, to coin a phrase, "new great man history," describing the way great men make decisions while being pushed and pulled by myriad forces from above and below.
As such, Pearlman's account defies straightforward summary. He covers all of the narrative high points of the origins, conduct, and quasi-conclusion of the Korean War, but in his telling none of those points follows a simple chain of causality. For example, he is not interested in affixing blame to anyone in particular for the start of the war. Instead, it appears that all sides, dealing with their internal competing interests and perceptions of the other actors, essentially stumbled into the fight. Likewise, the prosecution of the war did not follow any master script.
The vagaries of policymaking are even more important to the story of Truman and MacArthur. There was some flexibility on policy-i.e., preserving South Korea vs. uniting the two Koreas-as long as the war remained on the Korean Peninsula. But despite MacArthur's fervent desire, and the desire of some of his Republican backers in the United States, that flexibility did not extend to the policy decision of whether to take the war to mainland China. The general had always believed in using the Taiwanese to attack the mainland, but once the Chinese entered the war on the peninsula, he repeatedly and publicly insisted that military strategy should guide policy. Over time, such behavior from even the most respected of generals became too much for Truman, and the President was forced to relieve MacArthur. The removal of the general all but ended that policy dilemma, but did not resolve the problem of the stalemated war in Korea, the true source of Truman's historically low popularity. Nor did Dwight Eisenhower come to office with any brilliant policy solutions; rather, he was bailed out by competing interests entirely beyond his power. The Chinese lacked resources of their own, and the Soviets withdrew their support for them following Stalin's death and the realization among Soviet successors that supplying the Chinese war effort was crippling their economy. The ceasefire followed, but as with everything else in Pearlman's account, it came about more from an almost accidental confluence of historical circumstances than the coordinated actions of any particular individual or group.
In all of this, perhaps, Pearlman goes too far. His argument is well-takenthere is no doubt that the pluralistic American system does not lend itself to easy choices. Competing interest groups and divergent personalities, not to mention uncooperative enemies, make it well nigh impossible to craft consensus policies and strategies. But American policy-and strategy-making is not nearly as incoherent as it may seem. There are certain traditions and principles for which the United States almost always stands. For every era there are general and conditional policies that garner enough backing as to approach consensus (without ever quite getting there). Communism was always anathema to everything America stood for, but if the cost of defeating it meant the destruction of the whole world, then there was no point. The Korean War, whatever else came into play, was always about containing communism without starting World War III, nuclear or not. It was not easy, and it certainly got messy, but the underlying logic always held true.
To preserve the American system, those traditions, principles, and the general and conditional policies must be good enough, despite the noise generated by all the voices that have a say. The measure of American military strategymakers is not whether they can bring order to the chaos, it is how well they find the tune playing beneath the cacophony. The lesson of the Korea War, the lesson of Truman and MacArthur, is that it has always been so. At first glance, the title America's Army is likely to bring to mind the highly popular video game that was initially released as a public relations initiative to assist with Army recruiting. In the same vein, this informative book serves to educate its reader on the foundations, structures, cultures, and ongoing initiatives of America's preeminent land power force. The subtitle offers the US Army as a model for dealing with strategic issues of the contemporary and future environments that require joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) collaboration.
The book is a collection of types. It builds upon an earlier work by the authors, The U.S. Army in Transition, which detailed efforts to rebuild the Army as an all-volunteer force after the Vietnam War. This work lays out the history of the Army after the end of the Cold War and its transition into the twenty-first century. Brigadier General (Ret.) Bradford and Lieutenant General (Ret.) Brown are well-connected and in the know-it is obvious they are heavily engaged with senior levels of national defense policy and Army leadership. General Bradford is a former Military Fellow to the Council on Foreign Relations, and General Brown is a senior mentor to US European Command. The book also serves as a primer on the national security policy process as it lays out the top-level documents from the US National Security Strategy to The Army Plan and The Army Game Plan for executing its strategic responsibilities. A well-organized work, it begins with a strategic review of the global environment, provides an assessment of existent defense policy and strategies, then details the efforts of the Army to fulfill its mission to "fight and win the nation's wars."
The book has an explicitly stated purpose beyond showcasing the Army as the model "learning organization." The authors deride the lack of grand strategy for our nation and the default overreliance on the Army as a substitute for the prudent development of capable agencies to exert the diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power. They contend that "America's Army as an instrument of policy . . . has been held hostage to dysfunctional planning and execution within the government." The book uses the word "inept" several times in referring to civilian political leadership and that of senior policy and defense officials. The gauntlet is thrown squarely in their faces with sections titled "Strategic Misemployment" and "Mismanagement" of national defense in general and of the Army in particular. In light of those assertions, the authors are unabashed champions for the Army as it has evolved to deal with the challenges and obligations of the new century. Generals Bradford and Brown reinforce their observations that the Army is overused, underresourced (budget), and undersized.
The middle set of chapters provides insight into the Army of today by detailing its demographics, citing how the Army is reflective of American society, and ahead of it in inclusiveness and development of diversity. The authors offer The Army Plan and The Army Game Plan as paragons of strategic documents for the force. Army uniformed professionals will be familiar with the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) framework to execute strategic imperatives. Generals Bradford and Brown provide succinct examples of how the DOTMLPF framework may be useful for other agencies of the executive branch following the Army's lead.
The book, while interjecting JIIM in every chapter, rarely addresses the joint nature of military operations, an aspect which will not endear this work to the sister services. While it chronicles the rationale and efforts put forth to meet the challenges faced by the Army, critical assessment of the Army is not presented. We have experienced difficulties with the Army Force Generation model to meet the requirements for brigade combat teams and enabling support units for operational missions. Likewise, the modernization (read: Transformation) efforts of the Army embodied in the Future Combat System (FCS) have long been under scrutiny, and a recent decision by Secretary of Defense Gates has cancelled the FCS program in favor of individual, integrated acquisition efforts. DOTMLPF has been challenged as a set of processes that has been too slow to meet the exigencies of contemporary operations. Recent efforts of Business Process Reengineering and now Enterprise Management seek to redress those charges.
Unique offerings are found in the chapter on "Team of Leaders" which is part of a project that General Brown developed for European Command. Included in that section are calls for better integration of information and knowledge management to support collaborative teams. The concluding sections of the book present suggestions for strategic redirection for the twenty-first century (probably from the work of General Bradford with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars). The authors advocate revising a strategy of containment for our known and emerging threats. In addition, they present arguments for hedging strategies for those uncertain and unknown "wild card" scenarios the United States may face.
The book is well written and provides a ready reference to the evolution of the American Army in this new world. The detailed presentation of ongoing Army initiatives to achieve its strategic imperatives will inform military professionals and civilian readers alike. Both groups will no doubt benefit from reflection on the policy-strategyexecution recommendations provided by two well-thought leaders. Since the passing of Walter Lippmann in 1974, no journalist has risen to prominence as the authoritative voice in shaping the public debate on major issues in world affairs. Current candidates for the Lippmann prize include Thomas Friedman and Fareed Zakaria. Both are best-selling authors and regularly offer opinions on current events, Friedman for the The New York Times and Zakaria for Newsweek. Zakaria currently has more visibility on television as host of a CNN Sunday news show called GPS (for Global Public Square) that features in-depth interviews and expert roundtables. What distinguishes Zakaria from other traditional journalists is his skill in asking questions grounded in a deep understanding of international relations. Given his international relations doctorate, newsmaker interviews, and journalist roundtables, he should have the edge in the Lippmann sweepstakes.
Zakaria's latest book seeks to educate the reader on the shape of the world to come. Instead of a declinist view (as in the decline and fall of western civilization or of America as a global hegemon or hyperpower), Zakaria takes a more nuanced view. He focuses on the "rise of the rest"-especially the so-called BRIC countries; Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Given the pace of globalization, the diffusion of information technology, and the universalization of best business practices, is it now true that the international economy will create the conditions for the emergence of new national powers?
In Chapter 1, "The Rise of the Rest," the author emphasizes three fundamental changes as "tectonic power shifts" in the distribution of political, economic, and cultural power. In this broad historical analysis (that historians should take issue with), he points to western dominance from the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries, to a nineteenth century Pax Americana, and now a third phase-the rise of the rest. Chapter 2, "The Cup Runneth Over," is another quick review of world history since the 1970s. Zakaria claims "we," the United States, did not see 9/11 coming, were slow to respond to the Islamic extremist threats, ignored the rise of nationalism in the region formerly called the Third World, and missed the global political awakening (Zbigniew Brzezinski's term). In short, Zakaria surmises that the United States was in the midst of globalization but "forgot to globalize itself." The book's middle chapters are the heart of the argument and provide interesting insights on China, in Chapter 4, as "The Challenger," and Chapter 5, on India, as "The Ally." Zakaria's perspective, based in part on his own story of arriving in America from India in 1982, adds an important dimension. His admiration for Chinese diplomacy and use of soft power is clear-they take a long-term perspective with a "nonpreachy attitude." He writes of a new Mutually Assured Destruction, with the Chinese need for US markets and the US need for China to finance its debts, as ensuring stability. He sees Chinese deals with Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Sudan, with no ethical strings, as a way to separate business from politics. Why any of this amoral stability is especially good for the US national interest is not explained. Is this the post-American world we seek? The good news overall on US-China relations is Zakaria's contention that China is not a military threat and will retain a regional worldview. Given Zakaria's personal narrative, the chapter on Indian history and politics and Hindu culture is especially fascinating. The contrast between the efficient, autocratic China and the messy, democratic India draws interesting parallels to Aaron Friedberg's In the Shadow of the Garrison State where the command and control Soviet empire collapses under its own weight while the freewheeling, capitalist United States becomes the sole superpower. In contrast to the Cold War pattern of extended competition, Zakaria claims that China has already won the Asian great power sweepstakes, but the United States will find a stronger relationship with India, given common language, worldview, diverse federal structures, and chaotic politics.
The final two chapters return to Zakaria's prescriptions for how the United States should deal with the rise of the remainder. Chapter 6 addresses American power with a historical analogy of the British Empire's decline starting in 1897 at the time of Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee (when one-quarter of the world's population got a day off). The Boer War marks the beginning of the end, kind of like the United States in Iraq-"History is happening again." But Zakaria quickly refutes this obvious straw man to return to a happy ending. America's "dynamic economy" will save the day.
Chapter 7 on "American Purpose" is the most disappointing part of the book. Here the author asks "How did the United States blow it?" as if the United States ever really did run the world. Zakaria's indirect conclusion appears to be that George W. Bush and the Republicans are at fault. After all, he points out, when Bill Clinton visited India he was treated like a "rock star." Continuing his pre-financial collapse logic, Zakaria proposes that the US government follow the model of American multinationals and eliminate managerial and diplomatic imperialism. Again, so much for economic and political projections about the near term.
Zakaria concludes by offering "six simple guidelines" for reversing course: set priorities; build broad institutional rules; follow Bismarck's example of building relations with all great powers and avoid the British balance-of-power politics that made unreliable allies and determined enemies; build a post-American world order; think asymmetrically, not militarily (scuttle US Africa Command in favor of a diplomatic corps of technicians and nation-builders for Africa); and think of legitimacy as power. His example of the sixth point is that the Chinese students in Tiananmen Square built a replica of the Statue of Liberty, not an F-16 fighter. He does not suggest how this act of defiance and symbolism of American liberty led to any productive future for the students when faced with Chinese tanks and troops.
The concluding section continues with the author's view that "fear and loathing" are rampant and urges the United States to "stop cowering in fear." Citing a "climate of paranoia and panic," he observes a "nation consumed by anxiety." All this of course is inflamed by the rhetoric of Giuliani, Romney, and Tancredo in marked contrast to Bill Clinton and Hubert Humphrey. Zakaria sounds overly strident and patronizing in providing simple prescriptions for an increasingly complex, diverse, and fragmented world-stereotyping heroes and villains-and handicapping who is winning and who is losing in world affairs. Perhaps these are observations worthy of our attention, or possibly Zakaria has been captured by the sensationalism of television journalism. We can hope he will apply his considerable writing talents and scholarship to more in-depth books, especially on the regional geopolitics of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, where he can infuse his scholarship and contacts with his compelling personal story. For now, the race for the Lippmann prize goes on. Brendan Simms continues to demonstrate that he is a force to be reckoned with in his massive and sweeping revisionist account of the strategic rise of Great Britain during the eighteenth century. Examining in detail three British victories-the War of the Spanish Succession, War of the Austrian Succession, and Seven Years' War-as well as a defeat, the loss of the 13 American colonies, Simms argues that Britain's rise to greatness was based upon a coherent strategic culture that was firmly Eurocentric. Eminently readable and extensively researched and documented, in the end Three Victories and a Defeat is not completely convincing, but it is an impressive and significant contribution to British history and European diplomatic history. Without question the work should be considered essential reading for anyone interested in British history, European strategic and diplomatic history, or the American Revolution.
Three Victories and a Defeat
Countering the long-held and widely accepted view that Britain's extraordinary rise to power in the eighteenth century was primarily due to her navy and financial system, Simms argues that British strength was based upon its European connection, particularly the Hanoverian monarchy's link to its German kingdom and related alliances within Europe. Rather than events outside of Europe influencing British success, Simms suggests that it was wise British policies within Europe that allowed British naval power to grow. It was the developments within Europe that most influenced British welfare, not events overseas. Simms augments his revisionist approach with additional debate-changing and provocative positions.
One of his more remarkable assertions is that the seas surrounding the British Isles were not so much a protective barrier allowing Britain to develop under a reduced threat of outside interference or invasion, but rather a high-speed road connecting Britain to the world, acting as "a bridge, not a moat." Simms also argues that the question as to where Britain fits in the international strategic framework-within Europe or across the ocean-was at least as vital an issue in the eighteenth century as it is today, and then as now the tension undergirding this debate informed all international issues. Furthermore, Simms views the American Revolution as best understood as a collision between imperialistic powers. Following the Seven Years' War, the colonies wished to continue to expand their territory westward, while their colonial master wanted them to maintain a pacifistic stance. This contrary outlook would prove instrumental to the destruction of the First British Empire. Simms also addresses the contemporary issue of preemptive war, somewhat reminiscent of the Bush Doctrine, in his investigation of the British destruction of the Spanish fleet at Cape Passaro in 1718.
The depth and breadth of the scholarship of this hefty work is truly awe inspiring. The bibliography alone consists of 40 densely packed pages of primary and secondary sources, and Simms's mastery of traditional and contemporary historiography is unlikely to be surpassed any time soon. He is equally confident discussing the Atlantic World concept championed by David Armitage, classic works such as The Rise of England by John Robert Seeley, and virtually anything in between. The author's documentation takes a rather novel and useful approach; throughout the entire work endnotes are listed at the end of each paragraph with the contents of the note containing a substantive discussion of relevant historiography related to the preceding passage. For any academic interested in the period, this book will serve as an invaluable resource.
With all that has been addressed, it should be difficult to find fault with such a monumental effort. Despite the strength of scholarship, the volume of supporting evidence, and the skill of the argument, however, the book is unsuccessful in proving that Britain's transformation from a remote and relatively backward kingdom into a major European and world power was primarily a result of a focus on European alliances and that abandonment of this focus led to disaster in the American Revolution. Repeatedly Simms makes his point: England's-and later Britain's-strength was directly related to its connection to Europe. When this connection was out of kilter, so was Britain's international position. For example, early on the author posits with some exaggeration that "Charles had made England an island again, and the political nation did not thank him for it." Greater overstatement occurs regarding George III. "George III had come to the throne amid great hopes in 1760; 23 years later he had presided over the greatest and most irrevocable strategic disaster in British history."
As bold as these statements are they are also misleading. At some level comparisons of disasters are rather pointless, but the loss of possessions in France at the end of the Hundred Years' War or the loss of India (and empire) in 1947 can also be regarded as both disastrous and irrevocable. When put in context, however, there are other aspects to consider (the losses opened greater opportunities and eliminated an insurmountable burden). Thus, it could be argued that upon the independence of the American colonies, a far greater empire and further improved international situation was the eventual result, which Simms acknowledges in passing in the final two pages of his work.
Overall, this is a magnificent and impressive piece of scholarship. Its reorientation of the importance of the European connection to British international standing in the eighteenth century will undoubtedly generate new interest and scholarship. Despite its overemphasis on the "Continental commitment," which Simms acknowledges ("Perhaps British statesmen, and therefore this book, spent more time down German rabbit holes than was strictly necessary"), the work will stand as a required reference on the period.
